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Abstract: This article seeks to reassess the empirical literature on real exchange rate misalignment and growth in light of 
the extensive discussion about the relationship between income distribution and growth in developing economies. We state 
that the dynamic relationship between changes in the real exchange rate and output growth can be characterised by two 
conflicting partial effects, as follows: i) undervaluation promotes growth-enhancing changes in the productive structure of the 
economy by stimulating technological progress and knowledge spillovers, thus affecting positively output growth; ii) 
undervaluation raises income inequality and hence harms output growth. Though there are a vast number of empirical studies 
presenting robust evidence of a positive relationship between currency undervaluation and growth for developing economies, 
none has yet explicitly considered the potentially negative distributional effects of undervaluation on growth. Our empirical 
model adds to this literature by suggesting that, once both functional income distribution and the level of technological 
capabilities as relevant features of the structure of the economy are explicitly taken into account, the direct impact of real 
exchange rate misalignment on growth becomes statistically non-significant for a representative sample of developing 
countries. Further, based on our results, we state that the real exchange rate only affects growth indirectly through its impacts 
on functional income distribution and technological innovation. Our estimates have shown that the indirect impact of 
undervaluation on growth in developing countries is negatively signed. The results are robust to accounting for reverse 
causality through GMM-system analysis, using lagged observations in difference and level of endogenous variables as 
instruments. 
 
Keywords: Exchange rate, output growth, income distribution, technological capabilities. 







The impact of the real exchange rate (RER) misalignments on growth has been extensively documented in the 
empirical literature but no solid consensus has emerged yet. First, there are different concepts of ‘RER 
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misalignment’1. Second, the concept of ‘RER misalignment’ presupposes the concept of ‘equilibrium RER’, 
which creates some disagreement since different authors sometimes use different sets of explanatory variables 
to estimate the equilibrium RER. Third, the literature also presents different results stemming from different 
econometric techniques used to estimate the models2. In spite of these technical issues, the majority of the 
literature seems to suggest that there is a positive relationship between a more competitive currency and growth 
in emerging markets (Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001; Cottani, Cavallo and Khan, 1990; Dollar, 1992; Gala, 
2007; Gala and Libanio, 2010; Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Gluzmann, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2012; 
Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann, 2013; Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón, 2005; Razmi, Rapetti 
and Skott, 2012; Rodrik, 2008; Vaz and Baer, 2014). Some theoretical arguments are used to support this 
empirical relationship. It is claimed that outward-oriented policies, expressed in terms of a devalued currency, 
in East Asian countries encouraged foreign trade and propelled economic growth, whereas inward-oriented 
policies employed in Latin America and Africa, associated with overvalued currencies hampered the growth 
of these regions (Cottani, Cavallo and Khan, 1990; Dollar, 1992). It is also stated that bad institutions and 
market failures affect disproportionately more the tradable sector than the non-tradable sector, and hence a 
currency undervaluation, that is an increase in the relative price of tradables, might work as a second-best 
mechanism on developing countries to correct this distortion, promote desirable structural change, and increase 
growth (Rodrik, 2008). Gala and Libanio (2010), from a Kaldorian perspective, argue that a competitive 
currency is good for growth because it boosts the industrial sector of the economy, which is where the 
increasing-returns activities are predominantly located. Therefore, currency undervaluation may spur growth 
through incentives to technological capabilities, capital accumulation and information spillovers to other firms 
and industries in the economy. Gala (2007) and Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann (2013) suggest 
that RER undervaluation increases profit margins by reducing real wages, hence boosting savings, investments 
and output growth3. Lastly, Guzman, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2017) argue that a stable and competitive RER 
may encourage economic diversification and structural change towards activities with higher technological 
content in developing economies. 
However, although another relevant feature of the structure of the economy is the distribution of factor 
income, very few empirical studies in this literature have explored the underlying distributional effects of 
undervalued currency on growth4. Currency undervaluation, by increasing the price in domestic currency of 
imported intermediate inputs used in the production process or by raising the service in domestic currency of 
the private external debt, feeds through into the domestic prices, thus causing an inflationary effect in the 
economy and so reduces the real wages. In addition, undervaluation also enhances the price competitiveness 
of domestic goods in the foreign markets and hence allows capitalists to increase the profit margins set over 
prime costs. In short, a reduction of real wages associated with a possible increase in the profit margins due to 
                                                          
1 According to the literature, the most commonly used methods to estimate the RER misalignment are: (i) the PPP-based measure, 
which uses deviations of the actual RER with respect to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in a benchmark year; (ii) the black 
market premium, which consists of calculating the difference between the black market and the official exchange rates; and (iii) 
the model-based measure, which is calculated as a deviation of the actual RER with respect to the equilibrium RER. 
2 Early studies employed pooled Ordinary Least Squares and fixed-effects panel data, whereas Generalized Method of Moments 
and panel cointegration have become more common very recently. 
3 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a more recent empirical literature offers a more nuanced notion about the RER-growth 
nexus. By incorporating non-linearities in the baseline regressions, some studies suggest that overvaluation and undervaluation 
may impact differently on growth (Nouira and Sekkat, 2012; Schroder, 2013), and also that the level of the RER misalignment 
matters (Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; Couharde and Sallenave, 2013). 
4 Gala (2007) and Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann (2013) do not test the robustness of their models to the inclusion of 
any measure of income distribution as control variable. However, it is worth noting that the post-Keynesian theory of growth in 
open economies has largely documented the impact of the RER on growth via changes in functional income distribution (see 
Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Blecker, 1989; Lima and Porcile, 2012; Ribeiro, McCombie and Lima, 2016). 
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currency undervaluation redistributes income from workers to capitalists5. Ergo, the supporters of currency 
undervaluation, by and large, are somehow in line with a long tradition in economics that can be traced back 
to the classics, Marx, Kaldor and Robinson which claims that growth is mainly driven by capital accumulation 
financed by saving. The redistribution of income from wages to profits increases aggregate saving (since 
capitalists have a higher marginal propensity to save than workers) and hence spurs capital accumulation and 
output growth.  
Alternatively, another tradition in the growth literature drawing upon the works of Kalecki, Keynes and 
Steindl argues that rising inequality may lead to economic stagnation. The rationale behind this argument is 
that higher inequality reduces aggregate consumption since households in the lower end of the income 
distribution have a higher propensity to consume than those at the top of the income distribution, which results 
in low levels of aggregate sales, low expected profits and so discourages capital accumulation. While the 
existing research suggests that RER undervaluation may boost technological progress and growth, it remains 
largely silent regarding the fact that undervaluation also raises income inequality and thus may adversely 
impact economic growth. A number of other transmission channels through which income inequality can harm 
growth can also be pointed out. Sociopolitical instability: more unequal societies tend to lead individuals to 
engage in rent-seeking activities or other manifestations such as violent protests and assassinations (e.g. 
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). Human capital investment with borrowing constraints: if wealth is more equally 
distributed more individuals are able to invest in human capital (e.g. Perotti, 1996; Castelló-Climent and 
Doménech, 2002). Education/fertility decisions: More equal societies have lower fertility rates and higher 
rates of investment within each family to finance the education of each child (e.g. Perotti, 1996). Endogenous 
fiscal policy: the more equal the society is, the lesser the demand for redistribution of income and, 
consequently, the lower the taxation on private investments (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994). Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) also argue that, from a demand-side approach, a greater 
income inequality may harm innovation by reducing the consumption of a poor majority, which could 
otherwise form mass markets. A vast empirical literature has also documented the effects of greater inequality 
on growth. Nonetheless, there are still a number of methodological challenges to be dealt with. The early 
literature on the subject largely used OLS estimation method and found a negative impact of inequality on 
growth (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Perotti, 1996). Subsequent 
works using fixed-effects and random-effects panel and 3SLS models found either positive or non-significant 
coefficients (e.g. Li and Zou, 1998; Barro, 2000). However, more recent studies estimate the models through 
GMM difference and system and find that greater inequality reduces growth for the whole sample. These 
studies also show that the impact seems to be negative for poorer countries and positive for richer countries 
(Castelló-Climent, 2010; Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller, 2014; Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014; OECD, 
2015). There is also little available data on inequality; inequality measures usually differ with respect to the 
time span, countries coverage and reference unit. Despite all these issues, the majority of the empirical 
literature seems to support the idea that an increase in income inequality tends to reduce growth rates in 
developing countries. 
Motivated by these considerations, our paper seeks to contribute to the literature by reassessing the 
undervaluation-growth nexus in light of the extensive research documenting the adverse impacts of greater 
inequality on growth in emerging markets. As discussed above, the relationship between RER variations and 
growth can be characterised by two conflicting partial effects, as follows: i) undervaluation promotes growth-
enhancing changes in the productive structure of the economy by stimulating technological progress and knowledge 
spillovers, thus affecting positively output growth; and ii) undervaluation raises income inequality by reducing 
real wages and hence harms aggregate consumption and output growth. Ergo, the aim of this paper is to 
empirically verify the net impact of undervaluation on growth.  
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We estimate two different cases: i) a baseline scenario in which growth depends on a set of conventional 
explanatory variables including an index of RER misalignment; ii) a scenario of interest wherein growth is 
regressed against the same set of explanatory variables (including the RER misalignment index) plus the wage 
share in income and the relative level of technological capabilities of the country as control variables. Unlike 
the previous studies, our findings suggest that by allowing for both the wage share and the relative level of 
technological content of the country into the baseline growth equation the RER misalignment index loses 
statistical significance indicating that relative prices have no direct impact on growth. Further empirical tests 
have shown that a competitive currency may have an adverse, indirect impact on growth through distributional 
effects and technological change. 
In the next section we present very briefly the underlying theoretical framework of this article. In section 3 
we discuss the data and methodology used in our estimates. In section 4 we test empirically our hypotheses. 
Lastly, we conclude.  
 
2 Technological progress, income distribution and growth: a brief overview 
Now we must address the two key hypotheses of this work: i) the relationship between the level of 
technological capabilities and growth; and ii) the impact of income distribution on output growth.  
 
2.1 Technological progress, non-price competitiveness and growth 
The first assumption is that in open economies an increase in the home country’s relative technological 
capabilities spurs growth by improving its non-price competitiveness in foreign trade. This hypothesis is 
strongly supported by the literature on theoretical and empirical grounds. Fagerberg (1988) questions the 
traditional wisdom by suggesting that technology and the ability to compete on delivery are the main factors 
affecting differences in international competitiveness, rather than relative unit labour costs reflecting 
differences in price-competitiveness. He also finds evidence for 15 industrial countries during the period 1960-
83 supporting his arguments. Amable and Verspagen (1995) find strong empirical evidence of the positive 
impact of technological progress on exports market shares for 5 industrialised countries and 18 industries over 
the period 1970-91. Hughes (1986) proposes the hypothesis that there is a two-way relationship between 
exports and innovation due to differences in the specificities of demand between export and domestic markets 
in a study for 46 UK manufacturing industries. Léon-Ledesma (2002) extends also finds a positive and 
statistically significant impact of technological innovations on exports and labour productivity growth for 17 
OECD countries from 1965-94. Araujo and Lima (2007) developed a disaggregated multi-sectoral version of 
Thirlwall’s Law, where a country can reach higher growth rates only by specialising in sectors with relatively 
high (low) income elasticities of demand for exports (imports). Gouvea and Lima (2010) test the multi-sectoral 
model and their results, in general, support the hypothesis that goods from relatively high technology-intensive 
sectors have higher (lower) income elasticities of demand for exports (imports) and higher growth rates. 
 
2.2 Income distribution and growth in open economies 
As aforementioned, there are two traditions in the economic growth literature. On the one hand, we have the 
classical-Marxian profit-led growth approach claiming that growth is mainly determined by saving and capital 
accumulation. On the other hand, we have the Kaleckian-Steindlian wage-led growth tradition stating that 
growth is driven by aggregate demand and capital accumulation (Dutt, 2017). Blecker (1989) and Bhaduri and 
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Marglin (1990) extend the demand-led growth approach in a more general formal framework that accounts for 
both wage- and profit-led expansion patterns. In their model, if aggregate consumption is more (less) 
responsive to an increase in the wage share than investment and net exports, then we have a wage-led (profit-
led) growth regime. According to this model, while a rising wage share boosts aggregate consumption (due to 
the marginal propensity to consume differential), it reduces expected profitability and harms price 
competitiveness of domestic goods in foreign trade and so adversely affects investment and net exports. This 
is why many economists argue that it is less likely to observe a wage-led growth regime in open economies. 
 However, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical works showing that rising wages may stimulate 
labour-saving technological progress, capital deepening and so increase labour productivity (e.g. Rowthorn, 
1999; Storm and Naastepad, 2011; Vergeer and Kleinknecht, 2010-11). These results suggest that the net effect 
of rising wages on relative unit labour cost and price competitiveness in open economies is an empirical 
question. More recently, Blecker (2016) argues that demand is more likely to be profit led in the short run and 
more likely to be wage led in the long run. Some empirical evidence support this conclusion by showing that 
the effect of a rising wage share on aggregate demand is highly sensitive to lag lengths (Kiefer and Rada, 
2015; Vargas Sánchez and Luna, 2014). 
In the context of open economies, variations in income distribution may also affect growth via changes in 
the consumption pattern and, consequently, the country’s non-price competitiveness. International trade in 
manufactured goods amongst developed countries can be heavily influenced by within-country income levels 
and income inequality. Given the existence of non-homothetic preferences6, the more unequally distributed 
the domestic income of a country, the greater its expenditures on luxury goods (Francois and Kaplan, 1996). 
Latin American structuralists also claimed that high levels of income inequality in developing countries led to 
sharp differences in the patterns of consumptions between the poor and the rich within these countries. As the 
upper class in these countries used to imitate the pattern of consumption of households from developed 
countries, a significant part of domestic saving leaked out of those countries in order to maintain the imports 
of superfluous and highly technological products from developed countries, thus slowing down investment 
and growth (Furtado 1968, 1969). A more recent literature also shows that, given the non-homothetic 
preferences hypothesis, countries with higher levels of income inequality tend to export more necessity goods 
and import more luxury goods (Mitra and Trindade, 2005; Bohman and Nilsson, 2007; Dalgin, Trindade and 
Mitra, 2008; Lee and Hummels, 2017).  
 
3 Methodology and data sources 
3.1 The real exchange rate misalignment 
To keep consistency and straight comparability with the literature, we draw on Rodrik (2008) to build an 
undervaluation index. First of all, we take the data from the Penn World Tables for exchange rate (XRAT) and 
PPP conversion factors (PPP) to calculate the log of the actual RER as follows: ln�RER𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = ln�𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ �                                                                                                                            (1) 
The subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 account for country and time-period, respectively. The price of tradable goods is usually 
given internationally, and the price of non-tradable goods is usually higher in developed countries. This is the 
                                                          
6 Ernst Engel shows that consumers tend to substitute luxury (income elasticity of demand greater than unity) for necessity (income 
elasticity of demand less than unity) goods, as income grows. Thus, the concept of non-homothetic preferences state that the 
share of income that consumers spend on luxury and necessity goods change as income increases.   
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widely known Balassa-Samuelson effect and we must consider that in our index. To do so, we must regress 
the log of the RER on the log of the GDP per capita (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡): ln�RER𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡��������� = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                 (2) 
Assuming the Balassa-Samuelson is statistically significant7, we can specify the undervaluation index as 
follows: ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ln�RER𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − ln�RER𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���������                                                                                                         (3) 
Our next step is to describe the growth equation in the light of our theoretical framework. 
 
3.2 The growth equation 
Here we seek to explain the growth performance of developing countries by using regression analysis. This 
empirical analysis is based on a sample of several countries over several periods of time. We follow a well-
stablished empirical growth literature by describing a country’s growth rate as a function of economic variables 
and then comparing the estimated model with the expected parameter values. 
 Most of the growth regressions in the literature follow the general specification below: 
𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡               (4) 
where 𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3,𝛽𝛽4 and 𝛽𝛽5 are parameters (𝛽𝛽0 ≷ 0,𝛽𝛽1 ≷ 0,𝛽𝛽2 > 0,𝛽𝛽3 > 0,𝛽𝛽4 ≷ 0 and 𝛽𝛽5 ≷ 0 are the 
expected signs), 𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the growth rate of the output per capita, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is the log of the initial 
output per capita to account for transitional convergence, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the log of the relative level of technological 
capabilities of each country, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the log of the wage share of income, 𝑋𝑋 is a set of regressors consisting of 
economic, political and social variables (all in log), 𝜈𝜈 represent unobserved country-specific effect, 𝜅𝜅 is a 
period-specific effect, and 𝜉𝜉 is the regression residual. 
As discussed above, we can also say that both 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, in turn, depend on the currency undervaluation 
index (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡):  
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜁𝜁�ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                            (5) 
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆�ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜉𝜉𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                          (6) 
where 𝜁𝜁 and 𝜆𝜆 are parameters (𝜁𝜁 > 0 and 𝜆𝜆 < 0 are the expected signs), and 𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜉𝜉𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are the residuals of 
equations (5) and (6) respectively. Once we have these equations, we can combine them all in order to analyse 
and see the net impact of an undervaluation on long-run growth during a given time span as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽∗ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗                                                (7) 
where 𝛽𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝛽2𝜁𝜁 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆 + 𝛽𝛽4 ≷ 0 and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜉𝜉𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are the extended parameter and residual 
vectors, respectively. In our empirical study we intend to estimate the extended parameter 𝛽𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝛽2𝜁𝜁 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆 +
𝛽𝛽4. This extended parameter yields the indirect impact of undervaluation on growth of output per capita. 
                                                          
7 We used a fixed-effect model with period-specific dummy variables to estimate equation (2). The fitted Balassa-Samuelson 





The sample consists of 54 developing countries and covers the period 1990-2010 (see the list of countries in 
the Appendix 1 and the descriptions of the variables and a table with descriptive statistics in the Appendix 2). 
Since in the literature a very weak statistical relationship between a competitive currency and higher growth 
rates is usually observed for developed countries (Gala, 2007; Rodrik, 2008), we decided to take into account 
only developing countries in our sample. For the econometric estimates, all the variables were transformed 
into logarithms. 
There are a large number of variables that can be used to explain growth. In order to maintain our work 
consistent and comparable with the existing empirical literature, we have decided to take into account some 
of the most commonly used variables in the previous studies. 
 The ‘initial real GDP per capita’ stands for the hypothesis of transitional dynamics. In mainstream growth 
models, a country’s growth rate depends on the initial level of the GDP. The conditional convergence 
hypothesis states that, other things held constant, economies that are lagging behind should grow faster than 
the rich countries usually due to the existence of diminishing returns to factors of production. The initial level 
of GPD per capita can also be viewed as a proxy for governance quality since it is expected that the higher the 
initial level of GDP per capita, the better the governance quality of the economy. Hence, we follow the existing 
literature and include the log of the initial GDP per capita as a potentially explanatory variable in our 
regression. 
 Mainstream growth models also use ‘government spending (%GDP)’ as a proxy for government burden. 
These models argue that governments can be a heavy burden on the economy when they impose high taxes, 
promote inefficient programs, do not eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, and distort market signals. The proxy 
commonly used to account for the government burden is the ratio of government current expenditures to GDP. 
However, mainstream economists, by and large, also acknowledge the importance of public investments on 
health, education, and security to promote growth.  
 The ‘terms of trade’ and ‘period-specific dummy’ variables account for external factors that can affect 
growth. Terms of trade tend to capture the external influence on each country, whereas the period-specific 
dummies are used to capture external factors affecting all countries simultaneously. Terms of trade account 
for changes in the foreign demand, relative costs of production, external financial inflows, etc. Period-specific 
dummies capture worldwide conditions at a given period of time such as booms and recessions, waves of 
technological change, economic reforms, etc. 
 The ‘population’ is included as an explanatory variable that accounts for the growth of the labour force. 
 The ‘technological capabilities’ variable is the ratio of each country’s labour productivity to the US labour 
productivity. This is a proxy for 𝑆𝑆 from our growth equation (4), which is the relative technological capability 
of the home country with respect to the foreign country. The rationale behind this proxy is based on the 
assumption that countries with a higher level of technological capabilities also tend to have a higher level of 
labour productivity. The US is used as a benchmark and represents the rich country pushing forward the world 
technological frontier. 
 Here we use the ‘wage share’ as a measure of functional income distribution. It is worth noting that the 
most commonly used measure of income inequality in the empirical literature is the GINI Index instead of the 
wage share. However, we chose the wage share variable over the GINI Index because we aim to focus our 
analysis on the role played by the conflicting claims on income by workers and capitalists on the economic 
performance of developing countries as vastly discussed in the post-Keynesian theoretical and empirical 
literature on growth and distribution. In the analysis of wage-led and profit-led growth regimes, income 
distribution is generally measured by the wage share of income. Inklaar and Timmer (2013) show how the 
wage share displayed in the Penn World Tables is calculated. 
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 We condition our list of control variables on the need both to consider enough potentially explanatory 
variables and to have a reasonable number of developing countries in our sample. Including more controls to 
account for institutional and structural heterogeneity across countries, for instance, would imply the exclusion 
of several countries from the sample. The time span considered also follows the same principle. 
 
3.4 Estimation method 
In this subsection we outline the econometric technique used to estimate the growth equation. Here we use a 
dynamic model of panel data. The growth regression presented above presents some challenges due to the 
existence of unobserved time- and country-specific effects. Normally, we can solve this problem by allowing 
into the baseline model period- and country-specific dummy variables. However, the methods used to account 
for country-specific effects, that is, the fixed-effect or difference estimators, tend not to be appropriate given 
the dynamic nature of the regression (Pesaran, 2015). Moreover, most of the explanatory variables tend to be 
endogenous to the growth rate and hence simultaneity or reverse causality must be properly controlled for.  
In order to deal with these problems, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and use the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the parameters 
of the model. These estimators are based on differencing regressions and instruments to control for unobserved 
period and country-specific effects. Moreover, it also uses previous observations of dependent and explanatory 
variables as instruments. There are two types of GMM estimation techniques: first-difference GMM and the 
system GMM. 
The GMM difference method represents a great improvement with respect to the standard fixed-effects and 
first difference estimators. The first-difference GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) seeks to 
eliminate country-specific effects and also uses lagged observations of the explanatory variables as 
instruments. However, the first-difference GMM method has a disadvantage in dealing with variables that tend 
to have a degree of persistence over time within a country, like income distribution for instance. This implies 
that we eliminate most of the variation in the variable(s) by taking the first difference. In this context, lagged 
observations of the explanatory variables tend to be weak instruments for the variables in difference, thus 
yielding also weak estimators.  
In order to solve this problem, we also use the system GMM by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). This method creates a system of regressions in difference and in level. The instruments of 
the regressions in first difference remain the same as in the GMM difference. The instruments used in the 
regressions in level are the lagged differences of the explanatory variables. Admittedly, in this estimation 
technique, the explanatory variables can still be correlated with the country-specific effects; nevertheless, the 
difference of these variables presents no correlation with these country-specific effects. 
 The validity of the GMM estimators depends greatly on the exogeneity of the instruments used in the 
baseline model. The exogeneity of the instruments can be tested by the J statistics of the commonly used 
Hansen test. The null hypothesis implies the joint validity of the instruments. In other words, a rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates that the instruments are not exogenous and hence the GMM estimator is not 
consistent. Roodman (2009) advises researchers not to take comfort in a Hansen test p-value below 0.1. 
Another test is the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first difference. The null hypothesis of this test examines 
if the residual of the regression in difference is second-order serially correlated. First-order serial correlation 
of the differenced error term is usually observed even when the error term in level is uncorrelated. Second-
order serial correlation of the residual term in difference implies that the error term is serially correlated. 
Therefore, the rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the residual term is serially correlated and follows 
a moving average process of, at least, order one. A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the instruments 
used are inappropriate and hence higher-order lags as instruments might be required. As for the instruments, 
a large number of instruments is likely to overfit the endogenous variables. The literature is not very specific 
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in determining the maximum number of instruments to be used in each case. Roodman (2009) suggests, as a 
relatively arbitrary rule of thumb, that instruments should not outnumber individual units in the panel (or 
countries in our case). Here we tried to keep the number of instrumental variables to a minimum and used up 
to 2 lags of the endogenous variables with the “collapse” function in order to limit the proliferation of 
instruments. 
The estimations were done using 4-year averages. This is a standard procedure in panel data analysis, as it 
reduces the unwanted effects caused by unit roots. We have two types of variables: endogenous and 
exogenous. The only exogenous variables in our model are ‘population’ and the period dummies.  
 
4 Empirical assessment 
To begin with, we estimate the relationship between RER and growth using the same procedure and similar 
control variables employed in the literature (e.g. Gala, 2007; Rodrik, 2008). These results are reported in Table 
1. It can be seen that our finding is in accordance with the previous literature and also supports the narrative 
that countries could spur growth by keeping the currency at competitive levels over long periods of time. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first column shows the results of the pooled OLS estimator and the second column shows the results of 
the fixed effects (within) OLS estimator. As previously mentioned, both methods are inconsistent in dynamical 
panel models. The third and fourth columns present the results of the GMM difference and system, 
respectively. Our analysis will focus on the estimates displayed in the fourth column, since the GMM-system 
is robust to accounting for reverse causality by using lagged observations in difference and level of endogenous 
variables as instruments and hence is the preferred method of estimation. As for the variable of interest, RER 
misalignment, we can see that its coefficient is positive and statistically significant. A coefficient of 0.0649 
means that if a country devalues its currency by 10%, then the country growth rate exhibits a 0.0649x10/100 
= 0.00649 percentage point increase. This result is in accordance with the previous studies cited above that 
estimate a linear relationship between RER misalignment and growth. Also note that the Hansen test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments and the null of the AR(2) test is not rejected either, 
which suggests that the residual term is not serially correlated. 
Nonetheless, when we include the level of technological capabilities and wage share in income as control 
variables in the growth equation, we find very different results. Table 2 shows that when we allow for the 
relative level of technological capabilities (current and lagged) and wage share (current and lagged) into the 
baseline equation, the impact of RER misalignment on growth becomes statistically non-significant.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows the striking result that, once we control the baseline equation of GDP per capita growth rate by 
the relative level of technological capabilities and wage share variables, the RER misalignment coefficient 
becomes statistically non-significant.  
Considering the GMM system estimates, the only statistically significant coefficients of the extended 
growth equation are the coefficients of the technological capabilities and wage share variables. As for the 
technological capabilities variable, the coefficient of the current impact of technological innovation on growth 
is positive (0.2877), whereas the coefficient of the technological capabilities from the previous period is 
negatively signed (-0.2018). This means that the overall impact of technological capabilities on growth is 0.2877 − 0.2018 = 0.0859. As for the wage share, we have also incorporated its current and the lagged 
observations into the baseline equation. Table 2 shows that the current impact of the wage share on GDP per 
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capita growth is negative (-0.1503) and the lagged impact is positive (0.1704), thus yielding a positive overall 
effect of an increased wage share on growth of −0.1503 + 0.1704 = 0.0201. Therefore, our empirical model 
shows that both the level of technological capabilities and the wage share are positively related to the growth 
of GDP per capita. It is worth remarking that, given the possible existence of reverse causality between either 
growth and income distribution or growth and technological capabilities, we keep on focusing our analysis on 
the GMM models. Note that the positive effect of technological capabilities and wage share on growth is 
observed across both GMM difference and system.   
Ergo, in the extended growth equation with technological capabilities and wage share the coefficient of the 
RER misalignment loses its statistical significance. Thus, given that the RER misalignment does not affect 
directly the growth rate, we must now test if the RER misalignment variable impacts growth indirectly through 
any possible direct effect on technological capabilities and wage share. 
Next, we estimate the impact of the RER on technological capabilities and wage share separately. The 
GMM system estimate in Table 3 shows that the impact of undervaluation on the level of the relative 
technological capability is not statistically significant.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
First and foremost, Table 3 shows a positive and non-statistically significant impact of RER misalignment on 
the relative level of technological capabilities in the GMM system model. Further, we also see that the 
autoregressive coefficient of technological capabilities is positive and highly significant. The coefficients of 
the current and lagged observations of the wage share do not seem to have any statistical significant impact 
on technological capabilities. We also included the growth of the GDP per capita as an explanatory variable 
in the baseline equation of the technological capabilities to account for the mechanism of learning by doing 
and increasing returns to scale (pseudo-Verdoorn effect) and found a positive significant effect. It is worth 
mentioning again the reverse causality issue between growth and technological capabilities is accounted for 
in the GMM system model. That said, let us now examine the impact of currency undervaluation on functional 
income distribution. 
In Table 4, we can observe a negative relationship between RER and the wage share, as expected. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of the RER misalignment is negative and highly significant in the GMM 
system model. This result suggests that undervalued currency reduces the wage share possibly by increasing 
domestic prices (or reducing the real wages) due to the exchange rate pass-through mechanism and also by 
raising profit margins. Table 4 also shows that the impact of lagged observations of technological capabilities 
on the wage share is negatively signed, which indicates that the adoption of new technologies in developing 
countries may be adversely affecting the bargaining power of workers. Lastly, note that an increase in the GDP 
per capita growth rate is associated with the decrease in the wage share, in average, across all developing 
countries in our sample, thus suggesting that increases in the labour productivity through the Kaldor-Verdoorn 
channel reduce the wage share. Once more, it is worth mentioning that both GMM models presented in Table 
4 are robust to the problem of reverse causality.  
Let us now present our estimate of the net impact of undervaluation on long-run growth. First, if we 
substitute the parameters obtained from our estimate in Table 2 into the extended growth equation (7), we 
have: 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −0.0036 × ∆ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                   (8) 
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Replacing by zero the statistically non-significant parameters, we have 𝛽𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝛽2𝜁𝜁 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆 + 𝛽𝛽4 = 0.0859 ×0 + 0.0201 × (−0.1794) + 0 = −0.00367F8. Therefore, when the partial effects of technological capabilities 
and the wage share on long-run growth are taken into account, it is observed a small, negative impact of 
undervaluation on growth. Our estimates show that if a country depreciated its currency by, say 10%, then the 
long-run growth rate would decrease by −0.0036 × 10 100⁄ = −0.00036 percentage point. Thus, our results 
from the extended model differ from most of the literature on RER and growth in developing countries.  
 In short, our empirical model explicitly considering technological capabilities and functional income 
distribution suggests that the average net impact of RER undervaluation on growth is small, negative and 
statistically significant.  
 
5 Concluding remarks 
This article is an attempt to re-evaluate the literature on RER and growth by taking into account the relationship 
between income distribution, the level of technological capabilities and growth in developing economies. We 
have pointed out how economists and policymakers alike have, by and large, neglected so far the impact of 
currency undervaluation on income distribution, and how changes in income distribution can affect the level 
of technological capabilities, consumption patterns, production structure, foreign trade and growth. Our 
empirical model suggests that, once functional income distribution and the relative level of technological 
capabilities are explicitly taken into account, the direct impact of RER misalignments on growth performance 
of developing countries becomes statistically non-significant. In fact, we find that the RER only affects growth 
indirectly through its impacts on distribution and the level of relative technological capabilities. Our estimates 
have shown, however, that the indirect impact of currency undervaluation on growth in developing countries 
is small, negative and statistically significant. 
These results have some important implications, especially in terms of policy. Our empirical findings show 
the necessity of further testing of the relationship between RER and growth with different control variables 
and different datasets. For instance, other measures of distribution of income as a relevant structural feature 
of the economy, e.g. the GINI Index, could be used to account for the distributive impact of undervaluation 
on growth; however, we leave this for future research. Arguably, these findings may vary for each country and 
period of time considered separately. This hypothesis could be tested also by time-series analysis, given the 
availability of reliable data over a sufficiently sizable time span, say, more than 100 observations, which may 
still be considered by some analysts as a small sample for time-series analysis. In the end of the day, the impact 
of undervaluation on growth is an open empirical question. However, our empirical study strongly suggests 
that researchers and policymakers seem to be neglecting the role played by the distribution of factor income 
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↑ 𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 ⇒↑ 𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑐ℎ 
Technological Progress (Tech) 
↑ 𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 ⇒↑ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑞 
Inequality (Ineq) 
 
↑ 𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑐ℎ + ↑ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑞 ⟹↑↓ 𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑤 ? Growth (Grw) 
16 
 
Table 1. Growth and RER misalignments 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-Effects GMM-Diff GMM-Sys 
























































Constant 0.1980  
(0.13) 
0.3985  
(0.31)   
0.8673  
(0.55) 
Observations 209 209 155 209 
Instruments   27 43 
R2 Adjusted 0.1547 0.0776   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
in first difference (p-value)   0.4208 0.4572 
Hansen test of joint validity  
of instruments (p-value)   0.0494 0.2714 
Note: 
1. Below the coefficients we report the standard errors. 
2. Two-step standard errors are robust to the Windmeijer (2005) heteroscedasticity correction, which greatly reduces the downward 
bias of the one-step standard error. 
3. Unobserved individual effects are removed by first differencing in the Fixed-Effects model and forward orthogonal deviation in 
the GMM-diff and -system. 
4. In both GMM-diff and -system only population and time dummies are strictly exogenous variables. 
5. The first and the second lags of the endogenous variables were used as instruments for the endogenous variables in the GMM-
diff and -system. 
6. We have collapsed the instruments in order to restrict the number of instruments (Roodman, 2006). 
7. The Hansen test: the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
8. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first difference: the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression has no 
second order serial correlation. 




Table 2. Growth, income distribution, technological capabilities and RER misalignment 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-Effects GMM-Diff GMM-Sys 
























































































Constant 0.2136**  
(2.09) 
0.0775  
(0.26)    
Observations 209 209 155 209 
Instruments   18 26 
R2 Adjusted 0.6239 0.5019   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
in first difference (p-value)   0.5065 0.8576 
Hansen test of joint validity  
of instruments (p-value)   0.5093 0.1998 
Note: 
1. Below the coefficients we report the standard errors. 
2. Two-step standard errors are robust to the Windmeijer (2005) heteroscedasticity correction, which greatly reduces the downward 
bias of the one-step standard error. 
3. Unobserved individual effects are removed by first differencing in the Fixed-Effects model and forward orthogonal deviation in 
the GMM-diff and -system. 
4. In both GMM-diff and -system only population and time dummies are strictly exogenous variables. 
5. The first and the second lags of the endogenous variables were used as instruments for the endogenous variables in the GMM-
diff and -system. 
6. We have collapsed the instruments in order to restrict the number of instruments (Roodman, 2006). 
7. The Hansen test: the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
8. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first difference: the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression has no 
second order serial correlation. 




Table 3. Technological capabilities and RER misalignment 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-Effects GMM-Diff GMM-Sys 



























































(2.56)    
Observations 215 215 161 215 
Instruments   26 41 
R2 Adjusted 0.9892 0.6519   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
in first difference (p-value)   0.3391 0.3356 
Hansen test of joint validity  
of instruments (p-value)   0.0031 0.1019 
Note: 
1. Below the coefficients we report the standard errors. 
2. Two-step standard errors are robust to the Windmeijer (2005) heteroscedasticity correction, which greatly reduces the downward 
bias of the one-step standard error. 
3. Unobserved individual effects are removed by first differencing in the Fixed-Effects model and forward orthogonal deviation in 
the GMM-diff and -system. 
4. In both GMM-diff and -system only population and time dummies are strictly exogenous variables. 
5. The first and the second lags of the endogenous variables were used as instruments for the endogenous variables in the GMM-
diff and -system. 
6. We have collapsed the instruments in order to restrict the number of instruments (Roodman, 2006). 
7. The Hansen test: the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
8. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first difference: the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression has no 
second order serial correlation. 




Table 4. Wage share and RER misalignment 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-Effects GMM-Diff GMM-Sys 
























































Constant -0.0513*  
(-1.90) 
-0.2639  
(-0.90)    
Observations 215 215 161 215 
Instruments   12 17 
R2 Adjusted 0.8947 0.3039   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
in first difference (p-value)   0.7987 0.3316 
Hansen test of joint validity  
of instruments (p-value)   0.2406 0.1948 
Note: 
1. Below the coefficients we report the standard errors. 
2. Two-step standard errors are robust to the Windmeijer (2005) heteroscedasticity correction, which greatly reduces the downward 
bias of the one-step standard error. 
3. Unobserved individual effects are removed by first differencing in the Fixed-Effects model and forward orthogonal deviation in 
the GMM-diff and -system. 
4. In both GMM-diff and -system only population and time dummies are strictly exogenous variables. 
5. The first and the second lags of the endogenous variables were used as instruments for the endogenous variables in the GMM-
diff and -system. 
6. We have collapsed the instruments in order to restrict the number of instruments (Roodman, 2006). 
7. The Hansen test: the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
8. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first difference: the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression has no 
second order serial correlation. 









List of countries 
Argentina Burundi  India  Korea, Republic of Namibia  South Africa 
Armenia  China  Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Niger  Sri Lanka  
Azerbaijan Colombia  Iran  Lesotho  Nigeria  Tanzania  
Bahamas  Costa Rica Iraq  Macao  Panama  Thailand  
Bahrain  Dominican Republic Israel  Macedonia Peru  Trinidad &Tobago 
Belarus  Egypt  Jamaica  Mauritius  Philippines Tunisia  
Bolivia  Gabon  Jordan  Mexico  Russia  Turkey  
Brazil  Georgia  Kazakhstan Moldova  Senegal  Ukraine  








List of variables 
Name Definition Source 
Real GDP per capita (RGDPCH) PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices PWT 
Real GDP per capita growth (1/4)∆(RGDPCH) Authors’ calculation 
Initial real GDP per capita Initial GDP per capita for each 4-year period Authors’ calculation 
XRAT Exchange rate to US dollar PWT 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity over GDP (in national currency 
units per US$) 
PWT 
RER RER = XRAT/PPP Authors’ calculation 
Labour productivity (RGDPL2WOK) PPP Converted GDP Laspeyres per worker at 2005 
constant prices (RGDPL2WOK) 
PWT 
US labour productivity US RGDPL2WOK PWT 
Technological capabilities Country labour productivity/US labour productivity Authors’ calculation 
Wage share Share of labour compensation in GDP at current national 
prices (LABSH) 
PWT 
Government spending (%GDP) Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP 
Per Capita at 2005 constant prices (KG) 
PWT 
PL_X Price level of exports, price level of USA GDP in 2005 PWT 
PL_M Price level of imports, price level of USA GDP in 2005 PWT 
Terms of trade PL_X/PL_M Authors’ calculation 
Population (in mil) Population in millions (POP) PWT 
 
 
Table of descriptive statistics (variables for 4-year periods)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth 263 0.0489052 0.0452222 -0.1186036 0.2046644 
Log of initial GDP per capita  269 826.929 1.057.775 5.872.834 1.075.703 
Log of technological capabilities  269 -1.879.949 1.016.423 -4.699.233 0.0790496 
Log of wage share  270 -0.7422106 0.2757789 -2.035.373 -0.1914301 
RER misalignment  269 0.00 0.3845977 -1.274.534 1.389.299 
Log of government expending (%GDP)  270 -1.782.595 0.4647139 -299.992 -0.5919721 
Log of terms of trade  269 4.612.034 0.1033506 4.245.777 4.921.646 
Log of population (in millions)  270 2.543.038 1.805.444 -1.334.451 7.173.998 
 
